FAA-H-8083-25C · Source PDF page 51
Aeronautical Decision-Making
The Decision-Making Process · PHAK page 2-12
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with others, but were not considered physically inclined. deflected position. Both the after takeoff and before landing
The accident-repeater group had better gymnastic skills, checklists require the tiller to be placed in the neutral position.
was considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated Everyman had overlooked this item.
rebellious behavior when under stress, were poor losers, and
liked to be the center of attention. One interpretation of this Now, is Everyman accident prone or just unlucky? Skipping
data—an adult predisposition to injury stems from childhood details on a checklist appears to be a common theme in the
behavior and environment—leads to the conclusion that preceding accidents. While most pilots have made similar
any pilot group should be comprised only of pilots who are mistakes, these errors were probably caught prior to a mishap
safety-conscious, industrious, and cooperative. due to extra margin, good warning systems, a sharp copilot,
or just good luck. What makes a pilot less prone to accidents?
Clearly, this is not only an inaccurate inference, it is
impossible. Pilots are drawn from the general population and The successful pilot possesses the ability to concentrate,
exhibit all types of personality traits. Thus, it is important that manage workloads, and monitor and perform several
good decision-making skills be taught to all pilots. simultaneous tasks. Some of the latest psychological
screenings used in aviation test applicants for their ability
Historically, the term “pilot error” has been used to describe to multitask, measuring both accuracy, as well as the
an accident in which an action or decision made by the individual’s ability to focus attention on several subjects
pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the simultaneously. The FAA oversaw an extensive research
accident. This definition also includes the pilot’s failure study on the similarities and dissimilarities of accident-free
to make a correct decision or take proper action. From a pilots and those who were not. The project surveyed over
broader perspective, the phrase “human factors related” more 4,000 pilots, half of whom had “clean” records while the
aptly describes these accidents. A single decision or event other half had been involved in an accident.
does not lead to an accident, but a series of events and the
resultant decisions together form a chain of events leading Five traits were discovered in pilots prone to having
to an outcome. accidents. These pilots:
• Have disdain toward rules
In his article “Accident-Prone Pilots,” Dr. Patrick R. Veillette
• Have very high correlation between accidents on their
uses the history of “Captain Everyman” to demonstrate how
flying records and safety violations on their driving
aircraft accidents are caused more by a chain of poor choices
records
rather than one single poor choice. In the case of Captain
Everyman, after a gear-up landing accident, he became • Frequently fall into the “thrill and adventure seeking”
involved in another accident while taxiing a Beech 58P Baron personality category
out of the ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher,
• Are impulsive rather than methodical and disciplined,
Everyman neglected to complete the fuel cross-feed check
both in their information gathering and in the speed
before taking off. Everyman, who was flying solo, left the
and selection of actions to be taken
right-fuel selector in the cross-feed position. Once aloft and
cruising, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected with • Have a disregard for or tend to under utilize outside
aileron trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding sources of information, including copilots, flight
off the left wing’s tank, making the wing lighter. attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors,
and ATC
After two hours of flight, the right engine quit when
The Decision-Making Process
Everyman was flying along a deep canyon gorge. While he
was trying to troubleshoot the cause of the right engine’s An understanding of the decision-making process provides
failure, the left engine quit. Everyman landed the aircraft on the pilot with a foundation for developing ADM and SRM
a river sand bar but it sank into ten feet of water. skills. While some situations, such as engine failure, require an
immediate pilot response using established procedures, there is
Several years later Everyman flew a de Havilland Twin usually time during a flight to analyze any changes that occur,
Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. When he gather information, and assess risks before reaching a decision.
returned to home base and landed, the aircraft veered sharply
to the left, departed the runway, and ran into a marsh 375 Risk management and risk intervention is much more than the
feet from the runway. The airframe and engines sustained simple definitions of the terms might suggest. Risk management
considerable damage. Upon inspecting the wreck, accident and risk intervention are decision-making processes designed
investigators found the nose wheel steering tiller in the fully to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and
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